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Job creation schemes (JCS) are a form of subsidised employment and aim at the stabilisation
and quali¯cation of unemployed persons with disadvantages on the labour market. They are
often criticised because they lack explicit quali¯cation of the participants and only promote
jobs that are not in line with the market. Recent empirical studies of JCS in Germany have
shown that the average e®ects for the participating individuals are negative. There may be two
possible reasons for this `ine®ectiveness': On the one hand it may be due to the poor quality of
programmes in conjunction with often cited stigma- and `locking-in' e®ects, on the other hand
ine±cient allocation of participants may be the reason. Hence, negative mean impacts may not
apply to all strata of the population since treatment e®ects are heterogeneous.
In this paper we analyse if individuals gain from participation in terms of employment. To
do so, we apply matching methods to estimate the average treatment e®ect on the treated with
respect to gender-speci¯c and regional di®erences in a ¯rst step. In a second step, we examine
three sources of e®ect heterogeneity: We start with a selection of special problem-groups of the
labour market, followed by a simple indicator based on the individual's number of disadvan-
tages (target score) to analyse whether programme e®ects di®er corresponding to the individual
labour market hindrances. At least we use the estimated participation probability to answer the
question whether a higher participation probability correlates with a higher programme impact.
We use data on all participants in JCS, who have started their programmes in February 2000,
and a comparison group of nonparticipants, who have been eligible for participation in January
2000 but have not participated in February.
Our results refer to December 2002. We ¯nd positive employment e®ects for women in West
Germany, whereas the results for men in that region are insigni¯cant. In East Germany men
and women are harmed by programme participation. Our ¯ndings for the selected target groups
of the labour market show that JCS do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances for
most of the groups. Persons who bene¯t from participation are long-term unemployed men in
West Germany and long-term unemployed women in both regions as well as older women and
women who are hard-to-place in West Germany. Referring to the results of the target scores the
expected tendency that higher impacts correlate with higher target scores is observable; unfor-
tunately, most of the estimates are insigni¯cant and one has to be cautious with interpretation.
The results of the strati¯cation matching for the correlation between participation probability
and programme impacts reveal no clear pattern. Even though the results could not con¯rm
some of our hypotheses, they show that heterogeneity in treatment e®ects is an important topic
which has to be considered accurately in further research. We also show that this might be a
way to improve e±ciency of ALMP and hence allocate scarce resources more e®ectively.Identifying E®ect Heterogeneity to Improve the
E±ciency of Job Creation Schemes in Germany¤
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11 Introduction
The permanent integration into regular employment is the primary purpose of active labour
market policy (ALMP) in Germany. To achieve this goal, the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) spends substantial amounts on measures like vocational training programmes (VT), job
creation schemes (JCS) and special promotion for disabled people and aspirants for vocational
rehabilitation. ALMP was ¯rst introduced in Germany in the late 1960s. Since then, the
labour market experienced several important changes, caused by the oil price shocks during the
1970s and the growth of the labour market after the German Uni¯cation in 1990. The set of
programmes was gradually adjusted to these changes. Despite these reforms and large spending
on ALMP, the German labour market is still plagued by high and persistent unemployment.
Therefore, evaluating ALMP has become a major topic and was also legally anchored in the
reformed legal basis for ALMP in 1998 (Social Code III). The main question to be answered is,
if programmes improve the employment chances of participants.
In this paper we evaluate the e®ects of JCS for the participating individuals. JCS, which
have been one major element of ALMP in Germany over the last years, are a form of subsidised
employment and aim at the stabilisation and quali¯cation of unemployed persons with disad-
vantages on the labour market. The main purpose of these programmes is the (re-)integration of
unemployed persons into the ¯rst labour market.1 Recent empirical studies of JCS for Germany
have shown that the average e®ects for the participating individuals are negative (see for exam-
ple Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004)).2 The reasons for these ¯ndings have to be analysed.
One possible explanation may be the poor quality of programmes in conjunction with often
cited stigma- and `locking-in'-e®ects. But leaving this argument aside for a moment, the results
may also come from ine±cient allocation mechanisms. The central motivation in this context
is that programme impacts are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000) and therefore negative
average e®ects may not apply for all strata of the population. As Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith
(1999) point out, negative mean impacts may be acceptable if most participants bene¯t from
participation. Abandoning the `common e®ect' assumption of treatment e®ects and identifying
the individuals who gain from the programmes is an obvious opportunity to improve their future
e±ciency. If we are able to identify the personal characteristics which are responsible for the ef-
fect heterogeneity in individual impacts, we can use this knowledge for a better future allocation
1 Other enacted purposes like the relief of the stock of unemployed in regions with great imbalances of the
labour market are secondary only and will not be evaluated here.
2 This is also a common ¯nding in the recent evaluation literature of ALMP programmes in Europe. Whereas
ALMP were seen as a reasonable opportunity to reduce and avoid unemployment for a long time, the interna-
tional experiences with the implemented programmes show a mixed picture. The majority of programmes seems
to be ine®ective in terms of their aimed at goals. As the overviews by Martin and Grubb (2001) for OECD
countries and Calmfors, Forslund, and HemstrÄ om (2002) for Sweden clarify, ALMP are in their present design
and implementation not able to achieve a lasting reduction of unemployment.
2of individuals to programmes. A good example is a situation where we ¯nd e.g. that a certain
programme works for older participants but does not work for younger participants at all. If in
the past more younger individuals have been allocated to the programme, the average e®ect of
the programme may have been negative. However, knowing the sources of e®ect heterogeneity
helps to achieve a better allocation of unemployed persons to programmes in the future, i.e.
assign only older people in our example.
Our evaluation focuses on two main issues: First, we analyse if individuals gain on average
from participation. To do so, we use matching methods to estimate the average treatment e®ect
on the treated. Thereby we take gender-speci¯c and regional di®erences into account. Since
the average e®ects may not apply to all strata of the population, we examine di®erent sources
of e®ect heterogeneity in a second step. We start with a selection of special problem-groups of
the labour market like long-term unemployed or individuals without professional training and
estimate their treatment e®ects separately. After that, we construct a simple indicator, which
we call target score, based on the individual's number of disadvantages on the labour market,
to analyse whether programme e®ects di®er corresponding to the individual labour market
hindrances. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most-disadvantaged, one would
expect stronger e®ects for persons with a higher target score. Finally, we use the estimated
participation probability to answer the question, whether a higher participation probability
correlates with a higher programme e®ect. We use data on participants, who started their JCS
programme in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants, who were eligible
for participation at the end of January 2000, but did not participate in February. We observe the
employment status of our sample until December 2002, i.e. almost three years after programmes
have started.
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we brie°y review some stylised
facts of ALMP and JCS in Germany. We present the data used in section three and introduce
the econometric methodology in section four. In section ¯ve we discuss the results for the main
population. After that, we present the results of the target approaches. Finally, section seven
concludes.3
2 Some Stylised Facts of Active Labour Market Policy and
Job Creation Schemes in Germany
The legal basis for ALMP in Germany is the Social Code III. ALMP are part of the employment
promotion and primarily aim at the permanent (re-)integration of unemployed persons into
3 Additional information to the estimations is provided by an ancillary appendix that can be downloaded from
the internet: http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/professoren/hujer/papers/identifying anc appendix.pdf
3regular employment. According to Social Code III, employment promotion should help to achieve
the balancing of labour demand and supply. Therefore, unemployment should be circumvented
by an e±cient ¯lling of vacancies and the increase of the individual employment chances due to
an upgrade of the worker's human capital. Although ALMP have a long tradition in Germany,
their importance increased after the German Uni¯cation in 1990. Especially in the eastern part,
ALMP were implemented on a large scale to cushion the strong employment reduction in the
¯rst years of the transition process. During the last decade two major instruments characterised
German ALMP: First, VT programmes that aim at a quali¯cation transfer to circumvent and
solve structural problems on the labour market. Second, JCS whose main purpose is to stabilise
and qualify unemployed workers for later re-integration into regular employment, but which are
also used to relive tense labour market situations in regions with high unemployment rates.
Promotion of JCS4 can be authorised if they support activities which are of value for society
and additional in nature. Furthermore, individuals have to be placed, whose last chance to
stabilise and qualify for later re-integration into regular employment is participation in these
schemes. Additional in nature means that the activities could not be executed without the
subsidy. Measures with a predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly up
to January 2002. The majority of activities is conducted in the public and non-commercial
sector. Financial support for JCS is obtained as a wage subsidy to the employer. Even though
JCS should be co-¯nanced measures where between 30 and 75 percent of the costs are subsidies
by the FEA and the rest is paid by the supporting institution, exceptions can be made in the
direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100 percent). The legal requirements for individuals
to enter JCS are relaxed by the Social Code III amendment (Job-AQTIV-Gesetz) in January
2002. Before that time, potential participants had to be long-term unemployed (more than one
year) or unemployed for at least six months within the last twelve months. Furthermore, they
had to ful¯l the conditions for the entitlement of unemployment compensation. In addition, the
local placement o±cers were allowed to place up to ¯ve percent of the allocated individuals who
did not meet these conditions (Five-Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are made for young
unemployed (under 25 years) without professional training, short-term unemployed (with at
least three months of unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or
quali¯ed.5 The subsidy is in general paid for 12 months, but may be extended up to 24 months
or even 36 months under special circumstances. Participants are allowed to do a practical
4 The legal basis for JCS is xx 260{271, 416 Social Code III. They have been the second most important
instrument of ALMP in Germany in respect of the ¯scal volume and the number of promoted individuals. For
2002 the number of promoted individuals in JCS amounts to 112,462 in East and 52,229 in West Germany. These
¯gures correspond to spendings from 1,639.5 million euro in East and 693.5 million euro in West Germany.
5 With the 2002 amendment, unemployed individuals whose only occupation opportunity is participation in
JCS can be placed in programmes independently of the preceding unemployment duration. In addition, the
Five-Percent-Quota was augmented up to ten percent.
4training up to 40 percent of the time and a VT up to 20 percent, together no more than 50
percent of the programme duration. Priority should be given to projects which enhance the
chances for permanent jobs, support structural improvement in social or environmental services
or aim at the integration of extremely hard-to-place individuals. Participation in JCS results
from placement by the local labour o±ce. Unemployed individuals who cannot be integrated
into regular employment or do not ¯t the conditions for another instrument of ALMP may be
o®ered a place. The responsible caseworker may cancel a running programme at any time, if the
participant can be placed into regular employment. If an unemployed person rejects the JCS
o®er or if a participant denies a career counselling by the placement o±cer, the labour o±ce can
stop the payment of unemployment bene¯ts for up to twelve weeks.
3 Data Set
The data used for the empirical analysis contain information on all participants, who were placed
in a JCS in February 2000, and on a comparison group of nonparticipants, who were eligible
for participation in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in February. Information on
nonparticipants and participants were merged from several sources of the FEA. Central source
for the information derived on participants is a prototype version of the programme participants
master data set (`Ma¼nahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei', MTG). This data set includes informa-
tion from the job-seekers data base (`Bewerberangebotsdatei', BewA), an adjusted version of
this data set for statistical purposes (ST4) and the particular information of subsidised employ-
ment programmes (ST11TN). For this reason, the MTG contains a large number of attributes to
describe individual aspects on the one hand and on the other hand provides a reasonable basis
for the construction of the comparison group. The included attributes can be split into four
classes: socio-demographic and quali¯cation information, labour market history and particular
programme information.6 The information on the comparison group is derived from the BewA
with the additional attributes of the ST4. Therefore, almost all characteristics in the analysis
for the comparison as well as for the treatment group originate from the same data sources (see
Appendix B for more details). The information is completed by a characterisation of the regional
labour market situation by a classi¯cation of similar and comparable labour o±ce districts (see
Blien et al. (2004) and appendix C).7
For the outcome variable we use information from the Employment Statistics Register (`Be-
6 The ¯nal version of the MTG includes information on all ALMP programmes of the FEA.
7 The value of good data is an essential building block for a valid evaluation. As for example Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1998) mention, having access to a geographically-matched comparison group administered
the same questionnaire as programme participants matters in devising e®ective non-experimental estimators of
programme impacts.
5schÄ aftigtenstatistik', BSt), which includes information on the total population of persons who
are registered in the social security system. These are employees and participants of several
ALMP programmes, but no self-employed or pensioners. We de¯ne only regular employment as
a success, whereas all kinds of subsidised employment or participations in ALMP programmes
are de¯ned as a failure. While this de¯nition might con°ict with the institutional setting, it
re°ects the economic point of view to measure the integration ability of JCS into non-subsidised
employment.8 To identify spells of regular employment without further promotion, we use the
excerpted information of the ¯nal version of the MTG on the individual's time spent in ALMP
programmes. We observe the labour market outcome for the participating and nonparticipating
group until December 2002. Our analysis in the following parts refer to this last month of the
observation period. So, all employment e®ects of JCS are estimated for December 2002, that is 35
months after programmes have started. We exclude information on participants in Berlin.9 Our
¯nal sample consists of 11,151 participants and 219,622 nonparticipants. Previous empirical
¯ndings have shown that the e®ects of JCS di®er with respect to region and gender (Hujer,
Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004). Therefore, we separate our analysis by these characteristics, i.e.
we separately estimate the e®ects for men and women in East and West Germany.
4 Econometric Methodology
Estimation of treatment e®ects based on non-experimental data requires consideration of some
identifying issues. As we want to compare participation in one speci¯c programme with non-
participation, we can use the potential outcome framework with two potential outcomes Y 1
(individual receives treatment) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment). The actually
observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1
i ¢ Di + (1 ¡ Di) ¢ Y 0
i , where
D 2 f0;1g is a binary treatment indicator. The treatment e®ect for each individual i is the
di®erence between her potential outcomes ¢i = Y 1
i ¡Y 0
i : Since one of the outcomes is unobserv-
able for each individual, there is no opportunity to calculate individual e®ects directly. Thus,
we have to concentrate on population averages of gains from treatment. A common evaluation
parameter is the average treatment e®ect on the treated (ATT), which focusses explicitly on the
e®ects of those for whom the program is actually intended. It is given by:
¢ATT = E(¢ j D = 1) = E(Y 1 j D = 1) ¡ E(Y 0 j D = 1): (1)
8 Only the ¯rst programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes is viewed as an
outcome of the ¯rst treatment and is de¯ned as a failure.
9 The special situation of the labour market in the capital city requires a separate evaluation of the integration
e®ects of JCS into regular employment. The small number of participants aggravates the interpretation of the
results.
6Given equation (1) the problem of selection bias is straightforward to see, since the second term
on the right hand side of equation (1) is unobservable.
If the condition E(Y 0 j D = 1) = E(Y 0 j D = 0) holds, we can use the nonparticipants as an
adequate control group. However, this identifying assumption is likely to hold only in randomised
experiments. Consequently, estimating the ATT by the di®erence between the subpopulation
means of participants E(Y 1 j D = 1) and nonparticipants E(Y 0 j D = 0) will lead to a selection
bias, which may be caused by observable (e.g. age, skill di®erences) or unobservable factors
(e.g. motivation). For both cases di®erent estimation strategies are available.10 If we are willing
to assume that all relevant attributes for selection are observable, the matching estimator is
an appealing choice. It is based on the idea that if individuals are similar conditional on all
relevant variables, further di®erences in the labour market outcome between participants and
nonparticipants result from the programme only.11 It is well known that matching on X can
become hazardous when X is of high dimension (`curse of dimensionality'). To deal with this
dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of balancing scores b(X),
i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates X such that the conditional distribution of X
given b(X) is independent of the assignment to treatment. For participants and nonparticipants
with the same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates X are the same, i.e. they are
balanced across the groups. The propensity score P(X), i.e. the probability of participating in
a programme, is one possible balancing score. It summarises the information of the observed
covariates X into a single index function. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if treatment
assignment is strongly ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given any balancing score.
Since we focus on ATT, it is su±cient to assume that (in the notation of Dawid (1979)):
Y 0 q DjP(X): (2)
Similar to randomization in a classical experiment, matching balances the distributions of all
relevant12 pre-treatment characteristics X in the treatment and comparison group, and thus
achieves independence between the potential outcomes and the assignment to treatment. Hence,
if the mean exists, E(Y 0 j P(X);D = 1) = E(Y 0 j P(X);D = 0) = E(Y 0 j P(X)) and the
missing counterfactual mean can be constructed from the outcomes of nonparticipants. In order
for both sides of the equations to be well de¯ned simultaneously for all P(X) it is usually
additionally assumed, that
Pr(D = 1 j X) < 1: (3)
10 See for example Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Angrist and Krueger (1999) or Blundell and Costa-
Dias (2002).
11 See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for a recent review regarding matching methods.
12 Relevant variables are all those covariates that jointly determine assignment to treatment and the potential
outcomes.
7for all X. This implies that the support of X is equal in both groups, i.e. S = Support(XjD =
1) = Support(XjD = 0). These assumptions are su±cient for identi¯cation of (1), because the
moments of the distribution of Y 1 for the treated are directly estimable.
Several matching methods have been suggested in the literature. Good overviews can be found
in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005). The choice of the
matching method usually involves a trade-o® between matching quality and variance. First, one
has to decide on how many nonparticipating individuals to match to a single treated individual.
Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and its closest neighbour. Therefore
it minimises the bias but might also involve an e±ciency loss, since a large number of close
neigbours is disregarded. Kernel-based matching on the other hand uses more nonparticipants
for each participant thereby reducing the variance but possibly increasing the bias. Finally,
using the same nonparticipating individual more than once (NN matching with replacement)
may possibly improve the matching quality, but increases the variance. In a companion paper
we have used the same data and tested the sensitivity of the results with respect to di®erent
matching methods (Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 2005). It turns out, that the results are not
sensitive to the choice of the matching estimator and therefore we will use and present only one
matching strategy, namely nearest-neighbour (NN) matching without replacement and a caliper
of 0.02. (See appendix A for technical details.)
5 Empirical Impacts of Job Creation Schemes
5.1 Estimating the Propensity Score
We have estimated the propensity scores using binary logit models with participation as de-
pendent variable. To take account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-speci¯c
interaction e®ects, we have estimated separate models for men and women in East and West
Germany.13 Several model speci¯cations have been tested for the selection of variables to be
included in the model. Our ¯nal speci¯cation contains explanatory variables like age, marital
status, the number of children, nationality and health restrictions that describe the sociodemo-
graphic background of individuals. Furthermore, quali¯cation is included by characteristics like
professional training, the occupational group, the professional rank and work experience. The
in°uence of the individual labour market history is given by the unemployment duration, the
number of (successless) placement propositions, the duration of the last occupation, the last con-
13 We have also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions using dummy variables for sex. However,
using the results of the two estimations ignores possible gender-speci¯c interaction e®ects and the fact, that the
coe±cients in the estimation di®er in their signi¯cance and magnitude. This leads to a worse matching quality
in the sense that the balancing of covariates after mathing is reduced, i.e. the standardised bias (see below) is
higher.
8tact to the personal caseworker, whether the person is an aspirant for vocational rehabilitation,
present placement restraints due to health restrictions and information on an ALMP partici-
pation in the past. The regional context is considered by using the classi¯cation of the FEA
for comparable labour o±ce districts (see Appendix C). Table 1 presents the estimation results
for the participation probability in JCS for the four main groups. Additionally, the number of
observations in the four participating and nonparticipating groups are included.
It becomes obvious, that allocation di®ers by regions. The coe±cients of the sociodemographic
variables show, that the participation probability of men in West Germany decreases with age,
while in East Germany older men and women are more likely to participate. This indicates the
slightly di®erent purpose of the programmes in East and West Germany. Especially in East
Germany, JCS function as a relief for the labour market and are used as a bridge to retirement.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that German nationals are more likely to participate than
foreigners. This may be due to the fact, that other measures of ALMP (e.g. language courses)
are preferred for foreigners. Independently of region, health restrictions increase the individual
participation probability. This ¯nding indicates an allocation according to the legal basis.
The coe±cients for the quali¯cation characteristics emphasise gender speci¯c di®erences in
the allocation. A higher quali¯cation increases the participation probability in both regions for
women, whereas the coe±cients are insigni¯cant for higher quali¯ed men. The positive coe±-
cients may be seen as an indication that for higher quali¯ed women it is even harder to return to
regular employment and so they are willing to participate in a JCS to ¯nish unemployment. As
expected, work experience reduces the participation probability of all groups. Work experience is
in general an important criterion for placement into regular employment. The ¯nding indicates,
that experienced workers have other opportunities on the labour market. Since unemployment
duration is an eligibility criterion for participation, its in°uence is of major importance. We
included unemployment duration in three categories, up to 13 weeks, between 13 weeks and
one year, and for more than one year. As expected, participation probability increases with
unemployment duration.
9Tab. 1: Estimation Results of the Logit-Models for the Propensity Score
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Constant -1.1739 0.2731 -3.1254 0.4533 -5.7880 0.3659 -8.0021 0.3944
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age -0.0599 0.0145 -0.0067 0.0235 0.0901 0.0141 0.1702 0.0136
Age(squared) 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Married -0.1676 0.0612 -0.4483 0.0761 0.2683 0.0506 0.1145 0.0344
Number of children 0.0653 0.0281 -0.0183 0.0439 -0.0335 0.0266 -0.0238 0.0184
German 0.4402 0.0683 0.2825 0.1211 0.6284 0.1966 0.7082 0.2432
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1 , 80% and over 0.9160 0.1826 1.3404 0.2578 0.5491 0.2758 1.1375 0.2442
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.8052 0.1267 0.6433 0.1978 0.4991 0.1270 0.6032 0.1242
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.1190 0.3658 1.9871 0.4246 0.5691 0.1925 0.7999 0.1954
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.2757 0.1570 0.0651 0.2685 -0.0708 0.1721 -0.0725 0.1826
Other health restrictions -0.0472 0.0892 -0.0751 0.1390 -0.1918 0.0716 -0.1422 0.0608
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.3364 0.0622 0.2294 0.1334 0.1015 0.0823 0.3428 0.0865
Industrial training -0.6738 0.0692 -0.0808 0.1399 -0.1777 0.0748 0.3315 0.0820
Full-time vocational school -0.7639 0.2685 -0.0734 0.2432 -0.3223 0.2594 0.8588 0.1384
Technical school -0.0987 0.1756 0.7183 0.1927 0.2227 0.1231 1.0166 0.0977
Polytechnic 0.3534 0.2009 1.4983 0.2144 -0.0135 0.2058 1.0388 0.1794
College, University 0.2399 0.1577 1.0221 0.1869 0.0810 0.1354 0.9004 0.1272
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 0.2222 0.0927 0.2628 0.2501 0.0092 0.0828 0.2370 0.0670
Mining, mineral extraction -0.5605 0.4657 { { -0.7494 0.5154 { {
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5810 0.1544 -0.1609 0.2605 -0.1954 0.0999 0.2149 0.0819
Service professions -0.3077 0.0544 0.3167 0.0995 -0.1739 0.0478 0.0127 0.0406
Other professions 0.1023 0.1533 0.3933 0.2628 -1.1891 0.2170 -1.2092 0.2860
Professional rank
Worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Worker, skilled worker -0.5499 0.0982 -0.1637 0.1944 -0.1811 0.0597 0.0657 0.0525
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.0163 0.1152 0.1490 0.1256 0.1809 0.1067 0.2197 0.0605
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.0877 0.1536 0.5131 0.1624 -0.2838 0.1662 -0.0404 0.1215
Other -0.0112 0.0563 0.1512 0.1054 0.0345 0.0528 0.1004 0.0437
Quali¯cation (with work experience) -0.3397 0.0745 -0.3139 0.1017 -0.2279 0.0695 -0.1175 0.0527
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0038 0.0004 -0.0028 0.0003
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.2055 0.0616 0.0698 0.0889 0.4673 0.0561 0.2509 0.0511
More than 52 weeks 0.3087 0.0678 0.0888 0.0974 0.4498 0.0599 0.1694 0.0509
Number of placement propositions 0.0494 0.0028 0.0530 0.0042 0.0610 0.0030 0.0919 0.0031
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0013 0.0125 0.0520 0.0177 -0.1204 0.0114 -0.0644 0.0085
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1533 0.1185 0.0696 0.2039 0.2958 0.0939 0.1535 0.1024
Placement restrictions -0.3396 0.0989 -0.2654 0.1546 -0.3164 0.0870 -0.3000 0.0825
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2292 0.0801 0.5301 0.1043 0.4830 0.0628 0.5263 0.0422
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.6479 0.2286 0.4613 0.4466 0.6545 0.0893 0.5634 0.0746
Job-preparative measure -0.4764 1.0285 2.6387 0.5245 1.1431 0.4289 0.3364 0.5250
Job creation scheme 2.1463 0.0777 3.0671 0.1141 1.7272 0.0546 1.5382 0.0418
Rehabilitation measure -0.0929 0.2706 0.9368 0.3406 0.4232 0.2273 0.3780 0.2720
Regional Context Variables3
Cluster Ia { { { { -0.1040 0.1291 0.1421 0.1238
Cluster Ib { { { { -0.3077 0.1248 -0.0242 0.1210
Cluster Ic { { { { -0.2838 0.1361 -0.1841 0.1292
Cluster II -0.2225 0.0730 -0.5666 0.0960 Ref. Ref.
Cluster III -0.1841 0.0722 -0.4601 0.0917 { { { {
Cluster IV -0.0080 0.1002 -0.4530 0.1423 { { { {
Cluster V Ref. Ref. { { { {
No. of Part. 2,140 1,052 2,924 5,035
No. of Nonpart. 44,095 34,227 64,788 76,512
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Ref. denotes the reference category.
{ not included in the estimation/ no observations.
1 DoR = Degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 See appendix C for further information. 10The number of (successless) placement propositions is an indicator for bad labour market
opportunities. The coe±cient a±rms allocation according to the law. A last interesting point
to note is, that placement restrictions annotated by the caseworker, harm the participation
probability. This is somewhat surprising, because JCS should even be o®ered to these groups.
The coe±cients for the regional context are in reference to the labour o±ce districts with
the best (in relation to the region) labour market environment. More severe labour market
conditions correlate with a decrease in the participation probabilities in both parts. For men
in East Germany, living in labour o±ce districts with average labour market opportunities
bears the clearest reduction of participation probability, while analogously for West German
women and men living in labour o±ce districts dominated by large cities with a above average
unemployment shows the strongest decrease. The better the labour market conditions in the
respective labour o±ce district, the more likely are the unemployed persons to participate.
5.2 Matching Quality and First Results
Quality of Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Before we present the results,
we ¯rst have to check the quality of our propensity score estimation and second, the success of
the matching procedure in balancing the covariates between treatment and comparison group.
Our model speci¯cation for the propensity score estimation was based on speci¯cation tests to
identify the relevant variables.14 One simple method to validate the ability of a good prediction
is the computation of hit-rates, i.e. the proportion of persons with a correct prediction of their
status (participation and nonparticipation). As becomes obvious from table 2, these hit-rates
lie between 70.6 percent for men and 75.7 percent for women in West Germany. For East
Germany the hit-rates are 74.2 for men and 72.2 percent for women. This implies a quite
accurate underlying model. However, the aim of propensity score matching is not to maximise
the hit-rate, but to balance the covariates between treatment and comparison groups. Since we
do not condition directly on all covariates but on the propensity score, we have to check the
ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant covariates. We do so by comparing the
absolute bias between the respective participating and nonparticipating groups before and after
matching took place. One suitable indicator to assess the distance in the marginal distributions
of the X-variables is the standardised bias (SB) suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
For each covariate X it is de¯ned as a percentage of the quotient between the di®erence of the
sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison subsamples and the square root of the
14 See Caliendo (2005) for an overview regarding such speci¯cation tests and other issues concerning the imple-
mentation of matching estimators.
11average of the sample variances in both groups. The SB before and after matching are given by
SBbefore = 100 ¢
(X1¡X0) p
0:5¢(V1(X)+V0(X)); SBafter = 100 ¢
(X1M¡X0M) p
0:5¢(V1M(X)+V0M(X)); (4)
where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group before matching and X0 (V0) the
analogue for the comparison group. X1M (V1M), X0M(V0M) are the corresponding values after
matching. This is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, e.g. by Sianesi (2004).
To abbreviate the documentation we present only the means of the SB before and after matching
for the four main groups (Table 2). While the mean SB lies between 10.83 and 14.62 percent
before matching, it reduces to 1.60 to 3.20 percent after matching.
Tab. 2: Some Quality Indicators
West Germany East-Germany
Men Women Men Women
Before Matching
Observations
1 46,235 35,271 67,712 81,505
Hit-Rate
2 70.6 75.7 74.2 72.2
Pseudo R
2 0.1389 0.1775 0.1225 0.1144
F-Test 2,406.8 (41) 1,679.4 (40) 2,951.3 (41) 4,323.3 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)
3 14.62 16.08 12.01 10.83
After Matching
Observations
4 4,246 1,960 5,846 10,054
Pseudo-R
2 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.003
F-Test 38.0 (41) 23.4 (40) 35.3 (41) 39.2 (40)
Mean of Standardised Bias (in percent)
3 2.51 3.20 1.78 1.60
1 Observations are the sum of participating and nonparticipating individuals.
2 Hit-rates are computed as follows: If the estimated propensity score is larger than the sample proportion of
persons taking treatment, i.e. ^ P(X) > ¹ P, observations are classi¯ed as `1'. If ^ P(X) · ¹ P observations are
classi¯ed as `0'.
3 Mean of Standardised Bias calculated as mean of the single characteristics' standardised biases.
4 Since we apply NN-matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02 the number of treated individuals is
reduced after matching by observations o® support. The numbers of the treated individuals can be calculated
by dividing the number of observations by 2.
Sianesi (2004) additionally suggests to re-estimate the propensity score on the matched sample,
that is only on participants and matched nonparticipants and compare the pseudo-R2's before
and after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates, how well the regressors X explain the participation
probability. After matching there should be no systematic di®erences in the distribution of the
covariates between both groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly low.
As the results from Table 2 show, this is true for our estimation. The results of the F-tests (with
degrees of freedom in brackets) point in the same direction indicating a joint in°uence before
and no joint in°uence after matching.
12First Results All estimated e®ects in the later sections of this paper correspond to December
2002, the last month of our observation period. We are aware of the fact, that consideration
of only this month bears some shortcomings for a valuable interpretation of the programme
e®ects. Since December 2002 is almost three years after programmes have started and with
respect to the average duration of programmes of twelve months for the majority of participants
almost two years after the programmes have ended, there may be other events in°uencing the
labour market status of participants and nonparticipants at that time. As we do not consider
further participation and assignment to other ALMP programmes explicitly in our estimation,
possible in°uences have to be mentioned. Apart from that criticism, our analysis focusses on
the mid-term e®ects of job creation schemes and therefore requires this time horizon.
To give an idea of the time path of the e®ects, ¯gure 1 presents the estimated e®ects for the four
main groups between February 2000 and December 2002. At the beginning of the observation
period, the programme e®ect is expected to be overlayed by so-called `locking-in'-e®ects (van
Ours, 2004) due to a reduced search intensity of the participants. This reduced search intensity
is plausible for participants, since they are occupied by participation and spend less time on
job search. Thus, a valid interpretation of the programme e®ects on the employment rates
should start after the majority of participants has left the programmes, i.e. after twelve months.
Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise and qualify unemployed persons for the re-integration
into regular employment, we would expect increasing employment rates after the programmes
have ended. We ¯nd these `locking-in'-e®ects for all groups (see ¯gure 1). After this initial fall
there is a clear rising tendency for the groups in West Germany and a moderate rising tendency
for the groups in East Germany. For the smallest group, women in West Germany, there is
the strongest rise in the employment rates with signi¯cant positive e®ects at the end of the
observation period in December 2002. The e®ects for men in West Germany are also rising,
but the e®ects are insigni¯cant in the end, i.e. an increase in the employability by participation
cannot be established. While the e®ects in West Germany are clearly rising, we ¯nd a stepwise
increase with relatively constant levels over one-year-periods in East Germany. Besides that, the
`locking-in'-e®ects during the ¯rst year after programmes start are not as strong as in the West.
This ¯nding can be interpreted as an indication of worse outside options for the nonparticipants.
Although the e®ects show a rising tendency for all groups, a signi¯cant increase of the em-
ployment rates due to participation can only be stated for women in West Germany, who have a
signi¯cant positive e®ect of 4.6 percent in December 2002. For men in West Germany we do not
¯nd any signi¯cant e®ects in December 2002, whereas men in East Germany have a signi¯cant
negative e®ect of -2.9 percent. For women in East Germany the e®ect is slightly better but
still signi¯cantly negative at -1.4 percent. So it seems, that JCS rather decrease than increase
the employment prospects of participants. Of course, due to the strong `locking-in'-e®ects, the
13Fig. 1: ATT (Employment) between February 2000 and December 2002
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starting position for the participants is on average lower than for nonparticipants. However,
since we observe the outcomes until 35 months after start of the programmes and almost two
years after the majority of the individuals has left the programmes, a successful programme
should overcompensate for this initial fall.
146 Targeting
Clearly, as already mentioned, one possible explanation for the discouraging results in the pre-
vious section may be the poor quality of the programmes in conjunction with stigma- and
`locking-in'-e®ects. Another possible cause might be an ine±cient allocation of participants.
Since programme e®ects are heterogeneous (Manski, 1997 and 2000) the average e®ects depicted
in the above section must not apply to all strata of the population. Negative mean impact
results may be acceptable, if the majority of participants gains from the programme (Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Abandoning the `common e®ect' assumption of treatment e®ects
and identifying the individuals that bene¯t from the programmes is an obvious opportunity to
improve the future e±ciency of ALMP. If we are able to identify the individual characteris-
tics, which are responsible for the e®ect heterogeneity in individual impacts, we can use this
knowledge to suggest allocation rules for a better future allotment of programme participants.
The potential improvement of allocation mechanisms is a much discussed topic in the recent
evaluation literature (see for example Lechner and Smith (2005), FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger
(2003) and FrÄ olich (2001)). An optimal allocation should guarantee the best results according to
the underlying programme goal, where two goals - e±ciency and equity - can be distinguished.
If the goal is e±ciency, programmes target at the maximisation of the impacts of the outcome of
interest. If the goal is equity, treatment is administered to those individuals identi¯ed as `need-
iest', i.e. for example those individuals with the lowest predicted re-employment probabilities
(Plesca and Smith, 2002). FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003) distinguish between statistical
and non-statistical allocation mechanisms.
Caseworker discretion is the most common non-statistical allocation mechanism. Potential
programme participants are interviewed by their personal caseworker and allocation to pro-
grammes depends on the caseworker's evaluation of the unemployed person's capabilities, the
individual's interests and the availability of slots in the particular programmes. The crucial
feature of the caseworker allocation mechanism for an optimal allocation of unemployed persons
to programmes is the knowledge of the characteristics of the unemployed person, the situation
on the local labour market and the programme providers as well as the professional expertise
of the caseworker (Lechner and Smith, 2005). There is only a small literature that examines
the quality of caseworker allocation in Europe. FrÄ olich (2001) analyses the e®ects of caseworker
allocation in Sweden; Lechner and Smith (2005) and FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger (2003) eval-
uate the e®ectiveness of Swiss caseworkers in comparison to a simulated targeting system. The
results indicate that caseworker allocation lacks the ability to achieve the expected programme
goals. Reasons for the ine®ectiveness of the caseworker allocation may be lack of knowledge
of caseworkers regarding the e®ectiveness of certain programmes. Caseworkers have to build
15expectations about impacts of programmes on a very uncertain basis. Additionally, the broad
variety of available programmes makes it di±cult to select an optimal strategy for a speci¯c
person (FrÄ olich, Lechner, and Steiger, 2003). Another issue concerns possible `cream-skimming'.
The experiences from the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) showed that tying the funding
to the performance of local programmes as measured by job placement rates creates the incen-
tive to serve the most able applicants, without regarding how much di®erent groups might have
bene¯ted from programmes (see for example Bell and Orr (2002)).
Statistical allocation mechanisms avoid these possible problems by relying on some model
indicating the individual gains of participation in a speci¯c programme. Up to now, there
is no consistent classi¯cation of statistical treatment rules. OECD (2002) de¯nes `pro¯ling'
as `a procedure where a numerical score, calculated on the basis of multivariate information,
determines the referral of a job-seeker to further employment services'. Based on this de¯nition,
we will present three approaches to identify potential sources of e®ect heterogeneity, which could
be used, if successful, for a better targeting in future. At ¯rst, we will select target groups with
disadvantages on the labour market, e.g. long-term unemployed persons. In a second step, we
will use these de¯nitions and build a simple index that we call `target score'. The target score
simply sums up the number of individual disadvantages. If programmes are tailored to the needs
of the most disadvantaged on the labour market, we would expect higher impacts for persons
with higher target scores. For the evaluation of the e®ects in the target groups and for the
target scores, we estimate separate propensity scores for each group and category considered.15
Finally, we test whether the e®ects di®er corresponding to di®erent participation probabilities.
To do so, we stratify our sample in 20 sub-samples along the propensity score of the participants
and use a strati¯cation matching estimator.
6.1 E®ects for Selected Target Groups
Identifying groups of participants who bene¯t from programmes is a central purpose of pro-
gramme evaluation. Recent evaluation studies of JCS in Germany (Hujer, Caliendo, and Thom-
sen, 2004) and experiences from abroad (Martin and Grubb, 2001) recommend a tighter target-
ing of programmes to individuals with disadvantages on the labour market. Selecting persons
that are supposed to have a below average employability is a sensible ¯rst approach to iden-
tify possible e®ect heterogeneity due to personal characteristics. Several groups of individuals,
who should be promoted predominantly are de¯ned in the Social Code III. These are long-term
unemployed persons, individuals with health restrictions or persons who aspire for vocational
15 The results of these estimations and the standardised biases before and after matching are available on request
by the authors and ready for download under
http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/professoren/hujer/papers/identifying anc appendix.pdf.
16rehabilitation.16 Further target groups are young ond older unemployed as well as workers with-
out any professional training. In addition, JCS should be particularly applied to individuals
with special placement restrictions.
Our selection is oriented on these legal de¯nitions. We estimate the e®ects for participants
younger than 25 years and for participants older than 50 years respectively. Further groups
are long-term (more than one year when programmes start) unemployed persons, individuals
with special placement restrictions due to health restrictions and aspirants for vocational re-
habilitation. Additionally, we select four groups of persons, who are hard to place. The ¯rst
group contains individuals with more than ¯ve (unsuccessful) placement propositions by the lo-
cal labour o±ces, the second group are the persons, who have already participated in an ALMP
programme before unemployment. Group three contains individuals without professional train-
ing and the last group are people without any work experience.
Table 3 contains the shares of individuals in each of the selected groups di®erentiated by
treatment status. For most of the groups, the results show signi¯cant di®erences of the shares
between treatment and comparison group. Thus, one can assume that these characteristics a®ect
the allocation decision to some extent. Surprisingly, long-term unemployment (more than 52
weeks) which is expected to be an important selection criterion (in accordance to the law), di®ers
only for men in East Germany. Additionally the shares of aspirants for vocational rehabilitation
of this group and the proportions of men and women without work experience in the region are
approximately equal for participants and nonparticipants. This shows once again the di®erent
purpose of JCS in East and West Germany.
Further notable ¯ndings are the di®erent proportions of participants between the regions.
While the share of younger unemployed (below 25 years) in West Germany is clearly larger in the
participants' group, the situation in East Germany is the other way round. Older unemployed
are more likely to participate here. These di®erences have to be interpreted in light of the
di®erent labour market situation in East and West Germany and the consequently di®erent
purpose of JCS in both regions. Placing a larger share of young unemployed into programmes
in West Germany complies to the law that postulates stabilising e®orts for later re-integration.
In East Germany, JCS are used to relieve the labour market and therefore older are more likely
than younger unemployed to participate.
Besides the age di®erences, it has to be mentioned that persons with a larger number of
placement propositions or who have participated in an ALMP programme before unemployment
are more frequently in the participating group. This agrees with the expectation as the number
of successless placement propositions directly indicates the placement di±culties. Furthermore,
16 This are especially persons, who are no more able to work in their profession due to health restrictions, and
therefore should receive a promotion for vocational rehabilitation.
17Tab. 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Target Groups (Par-
ticipants and NonParticipants)
West Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent
1
Age < 25 years 21.40 9.30 17.30 7.14
Age > 50 years 16.12 37.27 15.30 35.21
Without professional training 62.62 49.12 45.25 49.94
Without work experience 12.76 7.44 15.11 7.44
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)
2 39.16
¤ 40.79
¤ 39.16
¤ 42.16
¤
More than 5 placement propositions 49.21 21.21 42.49 17.05
Vocational rehabilitation
3 5.19 6.27 4.18 3.11
Placement restrictions
4 16.54 21.58 14.07 17.51
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 28.55 10.05 33.17 8.86
East Germany Men Women
Part. Nonpart. Part. Nonpart.
Variable Shares in percent
1
Age < 25 years 8.21 13.49 2.94 6.36
Age > 50 years 38.06 31.05 30.69 35.71
Without professional training 28.63 23.10 22.26 25.85
Without work experience 10.02
¤ 10.84
¤ 9.89
¤ 10.38
¤
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks)
2 37.55 30.75 49.45 48.89
More than 5 placement propositions 41.24 17.87 37.28 15.32
Vocational rehabilitation
3 7.46
¤ 7.48
¤ 3.10 4.60
Placement restrictions
4 13.47 16.16 7.47 11.92
Participation in ALMP before unemployment 47.16 17.08 57.28 27.85
¤ Denotes approximate equality of shares between treatment and comparison group (5% signif-
icance level).
1 Shares are computed with respect to the number of participating/nonparticipating individuals
in the according main group.
2 Unemployment duration for participants and nonparticipants at end of January 2000.
3 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to
be quali¯ed for a new profession.
4 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
earlier participation may identify to so-called `programme careerists', who are assigned to ALMP
programmes subsequently, interrupted by unemployment spells only.
Table 4 presents the employment e®ects in December 2002 for these nine groups with fur-
ther distinction for gender and region as above. It becomes obvious that programme e®ects are
heterogeneous across the selected groups. Whereas the results for the four main groups showed
18insigni¯cant e®ects for men in West Germany, men and women in East Germany su®ered from
participation and women in West Germany bene¯ted on average from programmes. Considera-
tion of the e®ects for the selected groups of male participants in West Germany shows, that the
e®ects are for almost all groups insigni¯cant, too, but with one exception. The group of long-
term unemployed men bene¯ts from participation and has an employment rate which is 5.03
percent higher compared to the rate of matched nonparticipants in December 2002. The female
counterparts in that region are the only group, who bene¯ted on average from participation.
With regard to the results in table 4, it becomes clear that this ¯nding does not hold for all
groups. While three groups clearly gain from participation, i.e. older (12.67 percent), long-term
unemployed (11.25 percent), and hard-to-place women indicated by the number of placement
propositions (7.79 percent), the others do not experience any enhancement of the employability.
Anyhow, the three signi¯cant e®ects are above the e®ects for the whole sample of females in
West Germany.
Turning to the estimates for the East German groups reveals a quite similar picture. Again,
most of the estimates are statistically insigni¯cant and participants do neither su®er nor bene¯t
form participation at all in December 2002. Whereas the results for men in this region have
been signi¯cantly negative on average, this ¯nding is con¯rmed by the result of one group only,
namely participants, who have participated in an ALMP programme before (-3.36 percent).
All other estimates do not show signi¯cant di®erences to the nonparticipants' outcomes. Re-
garding women, we ¯nd long-term unemployed to bene¯t from participation (2.45 percent). No
signi¯cant di®erences in the employment rates can be established for the remaining groups.
Together with the results for the West German groups, especially long-term unemployed
participants seem to bene¯t from programmes (except men in East Germany). This ¯nding is
somewhat satisfactory since JCS are especially arranged for this group. Although the e®ects
refer to one single month only, the results are plausible. Since occupations in JCS have to be
additional in nature, i.e. they do not compete with regular jobs to avert substitution e®ects, the
qualifying elements for market-competitive jobs have to be assumed to be negligible. Thus, the
stabilising elements in the design of JCS (to keep in touch with the labour market) may be more
important for this group. Furthermore, participation in JCS comes along with a stigmatisation
of the participant, if potential employers suspect a reduced productivity. However, long-term
unemployment is a stigma itself and hence, the additional stigma-e®ect of JCS might be of
minor importance. In contrast, for these groups participation must be seen as an indicator for
individual motivation to change the personal situation. Hence, the stigma-e®ect of JCS may be
more important for short-term unemployed and younger persons.
Summarising the ¯ndings for the selected target groups leads us to three recommendations.
First, due to the unsatisfactory results for most of the groups, where no di®erences in the
19Tab. 4: Effects for Selected Target Groups in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Group E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0276 0.0326 440 -0.0679 0.0573 161
Age > 50 years 0.0262 0.0241 344 0.1267 0.0562 159
Without professional training -0.0046 0.0169 1,323 0.0425 0.0297 451
Without work experience -0.0040 0.0414 256 -0.0703 0.0595 128
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) 0.0503 0.0169 832 0.1125 0.0326 403
More than 5 placement propositions 0.0300 0.0176 1,039 0.0779 0.0302 400
Vocational rehabilitation
1 0.0300 0.0603 106 0.0571 0.0845 36
Placement restrictions
2 0.0153 0.0287 335 0.1026 0.0562 130
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0323 0.0217 594 0.0541 0.0313 279
East Germany Men Women
Group E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
Age < 25 years -0.0437 0.0503 240 0.0278 0.0589 148
Age > 50 years -0.0130 0.0079 1,109 -0.0020 0.0093 1,529
Without professional training 0.0120 0.0161 833 -0.0215 0.0156 1,119
Without work experience 0.0069 0.0349 292 0.0225 0.0220 495
Long-term unemployed (more than 52 weeks) -0.0018 0.0093 1,097 0.0245 0.0080 2,487
More than 5 placement propositions -0.0264 0.0145 1,201 -0.0054 0.0108 1,869
Vocational rehabilitation
1 -0.0140 0.0369 217 -0.0068 0.0418 154
Placement restrictions
2 0.0189 0.0254 394 -0.0166 0.0217 368
Participation in ALMP before unemployment -0.0336 0.0114 1,378 -0.0028 0.0079 2,877
E®ects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and caliper of 0.02. Bold let-
ters indicate signi¯cance on a 5% level. Standard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50
replications.
1 Persons in vocational rehabilitation are no more able to work in their profession and have to be
quali¯ed for a new profession.
2 Placement restrictions refer to the assessment of the caseworker that health restrictions of the
job-seeker reduce the number the job opportunities.
employment rates between participants and nonparticipants could be established, JCS have to
be reviewed critically in terms of their goals. Nevertheless, they are no complete failure for
some participants as the results especially for long-term unemployed indicate. Second, a tighter
targeting of programmes to persons for whom the possible negative aspects (like stigmatisation,
lack of human capital transfer etc.) are only of minor importance for the individual labour market
prospects, should help to increase programme e±ciency. Third, since long-term unemployed
persons are not the majority of unemployed in Germany, the number of promotions should be
20reduced signi¯cantly. JCS are de¯nitely sensible for the most disadvantaged workers, but no
means for reducing unemployment permanently for all unemployed persons.
6.2 E®ects for Target Groups Using Target Scores
The results in the previous section show that JCS do not work for most of the analysed groups.
Nevertheless, as the estimates are signi¯cantly positive especially for the most disadvantaged
persons, the long-term unemployed, the question arises, whether a higher number of explicit
labour market disadvantages correlates with gains from participation. To answer this question
we build a simple index which we call `target score' as the sum of the individual number of
disadvantages from section 6.1. Without any particular weighting, each disadvantage adds one
point to the target score. Persons, who do not belong to any of the categories in section 6.1, have
a target score of zero. The maximum level is eight, since the categories for the age groups are
mutually exclusive. For example, if an individual is below 25 years old and has no professional
training, she is assigned a target score of two. If an individual belongs to three of the target
groups the target score is three, and so on. Due to a small number of individuals with a
target score of more than ¯ve, we summarise these persons in one group, i.e. target score ¯ve
(and more); the other categories refer to the actual number of disadvantages. We estimate the
programme e®ect on the employment rates in December 2002 within each category of the target
score.
If programmes are tailored to the needs of the most disadvantaged and if a higher target score
indicates higher need of assistance than we would expect better outcomes for higher scores. The
estimates of the e®ects in December 2002 are given in table 5. Ignoring the signi¯cance of the
estimates at ¯rst, the results show non-negative e®ects for all groups in West Germany with a
target score greater or equal three. For the lower target score groups, the picture is not that
homogeneous. While men in West Germany with a target score of one or two are harmed, women
with the same score seem to bene¯t. In East Germany, groups with a target score of less than
three have reduced employment rates in December 2002. For women with more disadvantages,
there seems to be no e®ect, while for men the estimates tend to be negative except for a target
score of three.
The tendencies in the results for West Germany support the hypothesis that a higher target
score coincides with a higher need of assistance and a better ¯t of programmes for those groups,
but a clear statement is hampered due to the insigni¯cant estimates for most groups. It is self-
evident that our construction of the target score is very simple and is not guided by some strong
theory. First, the di®erent targeting criteria are included with the same weights and clearly
may not have the same importance for the individual employability. Second, the selection of
groups is incomplete. There are other characteristics, that increase or decrease the individual
21Tab. 5: Estimated Effects for the Target Scores1
in December 2002
West Germany Men Women
Target-Score E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 0.0182 0.0850 55 -0.0133 0.0789 76
1 -0.0138 0.0363 295 0.0518 0.0401 208
2 -0.0180 0.0212 740 0.0316 0.0474 305
3 0.0256 0.0261 652 0.0276 0.0339 257
4 0.0199 0.0331 274 0.1176 0.0527 100
5 and more 0.1449 0.0591 84 0.0455 0.1033 32
East Germany Men Women
Target-Score E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
E®ect Std. Err. No. of
Partici-
pants
0 -0.1014 0.0484 141 -0.0812 0.0333 271
1 -0.0293 0.0198 581 -0.0064 0.0118 1,090
2 -0.0225 0.0155 937 -0.0093 0.0110 1,754
3 0.0013 0.0191 821 0.0112 0.0103 1,289
4 -0.0161 0.0213 322 0.0062 0.0159 508
5 and more -0.0532 0.0448 94 0.0000 0.0393 106
E®ects are estimated using 1-NN matching without replacement and
caliper of 0.02. Bold letters indicate signi¯cance on a 5% level. Stan-
dard errors calculated by bootstrapping with 50 replications.
1 Target Scores are calculated as the sum of the number of individual
disadvantages from the selection of the target groups.
employability. Third, the construction of the target score leaves room for further e®ect hetero-
geneity. The target score just notes the number of single targets, but does not identify clear sets
of disadvantages where participation improves the employability.
Unfortunately, considering the signi¯cance of the results shows that our assumption cannot
be empirically approved. For each of the West German groups only one estimate for the higher
target scores is signi¯cant. For men with a target score of ¯ve, i.e. ¯ve or more disadvantage
criteria on the labour market, the employment rates increase by 14.49 percent after participation,
for women with a target score of four by 11.76 percent. For the other groups, the estimates
are insigni¯cant, i.e. no clear increase or decrease in the employment rates by participation can
be established. The estimates for East Germany show a slightly di®erent picture. The results
illustrate, that allocating individuals without any of the selected targeting criteria and therefore
a target score of zero to programmes, reduces the employment rates in December 2002 by 10.14
22for men and 8.12 percent for women. Analogously to the ¯nding for West Germany, there are
no further signi¯cant results. Since our construction of the target score is very simple, it has
to be reviewed, whether incorporation of further selection criteria and/or a di®erent weighting
of the single targets may improve the signi¯cance of the estimates. Although the estimates are
unsatisfying yet, the usage of the target score provides some practical utility to identify possible
sources for e®ect heterogeneity.
6.3 Targeting by Strati¯cation Matching
The estimated propensity score re°ects the individual participation probability conditional on
the relevant observable characteristics. If allocation to the programme is target-oriented, a higher
participation probability should also correlate with a higher impact of treatment. Clearly, this
argument only holds, if the programmes are tailored according to the needs of the participants.
If this is not the case, i.e. if the programmes have the same e®ects for all participants, individuals
with low participation probabilities may bene¯t more since a high participation probability can
to some extent be interpreted as an indicator for bad labour market prospects. Furthermore, an
interesting opportunity arises, if the empirical evidence supports a positive relationship between
a higher participation probability and a higher impact of treatment. If this is the case, the
estimated participation probability could be used as an allocation instrument, i.e. persons with
higher propensity score values should be primarily allocated to programmes.
An intuitively appealing method to check this hypothesis is strati¯cation matching, also known
as blocking or subclassi¯cation. The idea is to divide the sample of participants and nonpartic-
ipants conditional on the propensity score into several strata. Within these strata, participants
and nonparticipants should have approximately the same probability of treatment. The average
treatment e®ect is estimated within each stratum as if random assignment holds. Estimation of
the treatment e®ect for the treated is carried out by weighting the within-strata average treat-
ment e®ects by the number of treated units. Strati¯cation matching can be interpreted as a
crude form of non-parametric regression where the unknown function is approximated by a step
function with ¯xed jump points (Imbens, 2004). An important issue in employing this estimator
is to make sure, that the covariates are balanced within each stratum. The distribution among
the treatment and comparison group should be balanced, if the true propensity score is constant.
Comparison of the distribution of covariates of both groups within strata yields a possibility to
assess the adequacy of the statistical model.
To check our hypothesis whether a higher participation probability correlates with a higher
programme impact, we divide our samples into twenty subclasses each. This division is based
on the estimated propensity scores of the participants.17 Therefore, we have the same number
17 Due to the large numbers of observations in our samples, using the whole range of the propensity scores of
23of participants in each stratum, but di®erent numbers of nonparticipants with approximately
the same scores as the participants. Individuals with the lowest participation probabilities are
placed in stratum 1, persons with the highest participation probabilities are placed in stratum
20. It can be seen that this strati¯cation leaves meaningful number of observations in each
stratum except women in West Germany.
The estimated treatment e®ects for each stratum are presented in table 6 for East Germany
and in table 7 for West Germany. The e®ectiveness of the programmes can be estimated by
comparing the employment rates of participants and nonparticipants in December 2002 given
by E(Y1) and E(Y0) in the tables. The average treatment e®ect within each stratum, i.e. the
di®erence of the mean outcomes of the participants and the nonparticipants, is also given (¢).
The last lines of the tables provide the average treatment e®ect on the treated. Obviously, these
e®ects are similar to those estimated with the NN-matching estimators in section 5. In addition
to the mean outcomes and the e®ects, the tables also present the results of the hypothesis testing
of equal propensity scores in the treatment and comparison group. We tested the null hypothesis
(H0) that the di®erence of the mean propensity scores in both groups is zero. Therefore, the
alternative hypothesis (HA) imposes inequality of the propensity score. The p-values of the HA
are given in the tables; if we reject the hypothesis due to a larger value than 0.05, we assume
equality of the propensity scores and therefore balancing of the covariates among both groups.18
The results of the hypothesis tests show that the division into twenty strata provides approx-
imately equal propensity scores for most groups. The equality is hampered only for the groups
at the borders of the propensity score range. For men in West Germany, strata 1, 5, 7 and 20
are imbalanced, for women in the same region strata 1, 17 and 19. In East Germany the strata
with lower participation probabilities are imbalanced. For women the propensity scores are not
balanced in 1 and 2, for men in 1 and 3, but also in stratum 19. Although we ¯nd signi¯cant
treatment e®ects for several strata, these ¯ndings do not assist our hypothesis. Taking a look at
the results for East Germany (table 6), we ¯nd that for the ¯rst four strata (except for women
in stratum 1) allocation of persons with a low participation probability has a tendential negative
in°uence on the employment chances in December 2002. For men in this region, this tendency
is stable for participants up to stratum 14; from stratum 15 onwards the direction of the e®ects
changes to positive. For women we could not establish a clear distinction, since most of the
e®ects are insigni¯cant. For participants in West Germany (table 7) our hypothesis cannot be
participants and nonparticipants leads to a skewed strati¯cation. Hence, we refer to the propensity scores of the
participants only to reduce this skewness. The choice of twenty strata for each of the four groups emerged from
balancing tests of the propensity score among treated and comparison persons using a smaller number of blocks.
18 We also checked the balancing property of strati¯cation by comparing the means of the incorporated variables
in the logit models for participants and nonparticipants within each stratum as suggested by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983). The results for selected variables are available on request by the authors in the ancillary appendix
under http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/professoren/hujer/papers/identifying anc appendix.pdf.
24Tab. 6: Results for Stratification Matching in East Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
¢ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
¢
1 Participants 146 0.1781 251 0.1355
Nonparticipants 16,171
0.0001
0.2366
-0.0585
18,980
0.0002
0.1221
0.0134
2 Participants 146 0.1781 252 0.1032
Nonparticipants 9,532
0.9303
0.2446
-0.0666
11,309
0.0168
0.1267
-0.0235
3 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 7,657
0.0218
0.2130
-0.0897
7,396
0.1633
0.1458
-0.0267
4 Participants 146 0.1575 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 5,529
0.3283
0.1923
-0.0347
5,641
0.1581
0.1480
-0.0568
5 Participants 147 0.0816 251 0.1633
Nonparticipants 4,432
0.0537
0.1588
-0.0772
5,098
0.2593
0.1497
0.0137
6 Participants 146 0.1233 252 0.1111
Nonparticipants 3,093
0.2077
0.1478
-0.0245
4,298
0.1555
0.1356
-0.0245
7 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.1627
Nonparticipants 2,727
0.9609
0.1298
-0.0476
3,852
0.5875
0.1449
0.0178
8 Participants 146 0.0685 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 2,640
0.4523
0.1182
-0.0497
2,804
0.3221
0.1566
-0.0494
9 Participants 146 0.1027 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 2,116
0.5098
0.1229
-0.0201
2,785
0.2600
0.1645
-0.0609
10 Participants 147 0.1020 252 0.0952
Nonparticipants 2,037
0.7602
0.1193
-0.0173
2,276
0.1690
0.1375
-0.0423
11 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1190
Nonparticipants 1,448
0.4703
0.1057
-0.0440
2,228
0.3124
0.1382
-0.0192
12 Participants 146 0.0959 252 0.1508
Nonparticipants 1,592
0.4960
0.1124
-0.0165
1,665
0.9466
0.1375
0.0133
13 Participants 146 0.0411 251 0.1036
Nonparticipants 1,132
0.3424
0.1140
-0.0729
1,651
0.9627
0.1187
-0.0151
14 Participants 146 0.0616 252 0.1310
Nonparticipants 980
0.8348
0.0990
-0.0373
1,471
0.0541
0.0938
0.0371
15 Participants 147 0.1224 252 0.0992
Nonparticipants 948
0.7724
0.0928
0.0296
1,143
0.2967
0.0866
0.0126
16 Participants 146 0.0890 252 0.1071
Nonparticipants 772
0.8285
0.0738
0.0152
1,124
0.9422
0.0907
0.0164
17 Participants 146 0.0753 251 0.0797
Nonparticipants 600
0.9521
0.0500
0.0253
910
0.3790
0.0868
-0.0071
18 Participants 146 0.0822 252 0.0913
Nonparticipants 645
0.4996
0.0419
0.0403
749
0.6872
0.1041
-0.0129
19 Participants 146 0.0548 252 0.1349
Nonparticipants 479
0.0053
0.0355
0.0193
648
0.7600
0.1157
0.0192
20 Participants 147 0.0748 252 0.1548
Nonparticipants 258
0.6655
0.0504
0.0244
442
0.6248
0.1281
0.0267
ATT: -0.0251 -0.0084
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups
are constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model
reported in Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P(Z;D = 1)¡P(Z;D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P(Z;D = 1)¡P(Z;D = 0) 6= 0
in stratum.
empirically approved either. One can loosely see that higher participation probabilities corre-
late with higher impacts, but these ¯ndings may be inconsistent as the balancing tests above
show. It seems that the participation probability is no adequate measure for e®ect heterogeneity
here and successful integration in regular employment depends on di®erent compositions of the
individual characteristics than selection into programmes.
25Tab. 7: Results for Stratification Matching in West Germany
Strata Men Women
No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
¢ No. of
Obs.
p-value
for HA
1
E(Y1),
E(Y0)
¢
1 Participants 107 0.1869 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 14,220
0.0000
0.1105
0.0764
12,954
0.0005
0.1197
0.2649
2 Participants 107 0.1963 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 4,913
0.1905
0.2009
-0.0046
4,119
0.1774
0.2391
0.1194
3 Participants 107 0.2336 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 4,065
0.2521
0.2303
0.0034
2,754
0.5364
0.2876
0.0201
4 Participants 107 0.2150 53 0.3962
Nonparticipants 3,522
0.8130
0.2504
-0.0355
2,782
0.7943
0.2793
0.1169
5 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3019
Nonparticipants 2,403
0.0430
0.2339
0.0278
1,742
0.6186
0.3129
-0.0110
6 Participants 107 0.1682 52 0.2692
Nonparticipants 2,384
0.5197
0.2680
-0.0998
1,556
0.7633
0.3033
-0.0341
7 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 2,331
0.0045
0.2540
-0.0484
1,347
0.9023
0.3215
0.0370
8 Participants 107 0.2056 52 0.2885
Nonparticipants 1,748
0.4353
0.2649
-0.0593
1,366
0.6411
0.3192
-0.0307
9 Participants 107 0.2336 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 1,533
0.2616
0.2701
-0.0364
1,214
0.9991
0.3311
-0.0481
10 Participants 107 0.2804 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 1,229
0.3627
0.2799
0.0005
841
0.6523
0.3639
-0.0242
11 Participants 107 0.1963 52 0.3269
Nonparticipants 1,049
0.1798
0.2793
-0.0831
611
0.8903
0.3453
-0.0184
12 Participants 107 0.2991 53 0.2830
Nonparticipants 929
0.5893
0.2648
0.0343
733
0.3965
0.3438
-0.0608
13 Participants 107 0.2617 52 0.3846
Nonparticipants 751
0.6554
0.2690
-0.0073
623
0.2097
0.3949
-0.0102
14 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 684
0.3683
0.2529
0.0088
571
0.3294
0.3468
-0.0260
15 Participants 107 0.2056 53 0.4340
Nonparticipants 661
0.5013
0.2723
-0.0667
447
0.2556
0.3154
0.1185
16 Participants 107 0.2430 52 0.3077
Nonparticipants 551
0.4412
0.1978
0.0452
265
0.0935
0.2906
0.0171
17 Participants 107 0.1402 53 0.3208
Nonparticipants 473
0.8646
0.1734
-0.0332
108
0.0282
0.2593
0.0615
18 Participants 107 0.1308 52 0.3654
Nonparticipants 295
0.0955
0.1186
0.0122
78
0.7560
0.1667
0.1987
19 Participants 107 0.2617 53 0.3396
Nonparticipants 191
0.4283
0.1204
0.1413
70
0.0389
0.1714
0.1682
20 Participants 107 0.2710 53 0.3585
Nonparticipants 163
0.0038
0.1104
0.1606
38
0.1637
0.0870
0.2715
ATT: 0.0018 0.0565
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level. Subgroups
are constructed using the estimated propensity score of the participants from the logit model
reported in Table 1.
1 Testing H0 : P(Z;D = 1)¡P(Z;D = 0) = 0. Corresponding HA: P(Z;D = 1)¡P(Z;D = 0) 6= 0
in stratum.
7 Conclusion
Previous empirical studies of JCS in Germany have shown that the average e®ects for partic-
ipating individuals are negative. Whereas this ine±ciency may be due to the poor quality of
26programmes, it may be also driven by an ine±cient allocation of potential participants to pro-
grammes. Allocation of individuals into programmes in Germany is accomplished by caseworker
discretion. On the one hand, a positive aspect of this mechanism is that decisions are based on
personal contact. On the other hand, since ALMP consist of very di®erent programmes, case-
workers may lack knowledge regarding programme impacts. Since this problem is not speci¯c to
Germany, the topic of a potential improvement of allocation mechanisms has become important
in recent literature. Broadly, two categories can be distinguished: Non-statistical allocation
mechanisms like caseworker discretion and statistical allocation mechanisms called pro¯ling or
targeting. Since statistical allocation systems are not introduced in the German labour market
yet, there is no empirical evidence for their e®ectiveness.
In this paper we estimate the average treatment e®ects for men and women in East and
West Germany participating in JCS. Following that we use three strategies to identify possible
e®ect heterogeneity. We use data on all participants, who started a JCS in February 2000,
and on nonparticipants from January 2000, who were eligible to participate, but did not enter
those schemes in February. The employment e®ects of JCS are evaluated in December 2002.
The results show positive e®ects for women in West Germany and negative e®ects for men and
women in East Germany, men in West Germany do neither su®er nor bene¯t from participation.
For the three approaches used to analyse e®ect heterogeneity we select target groups with
disadvantages on the labour market oriented by the de¯nition of the legal basis in a ¯rst step.
Our ¯ndings show that JCS do neither harm nor improve the labour market chances for most of
the groups. Exceptions are long-term unemployed men in West Germany, long-term unemployed
women in both regions, older women and women who are hard-to-place in West Germany,
who bene¯t from participation. Given these results and remembering that (re-)integration into
regular employment is the main purpose, it has to be recommended that JCS should be targeted
to those bene¯ting groups and should not be used on large scale. In a second step, we use these
de¯nitions to build up a simple indicator (target score) as the sum of the individual number of
disadvantages. If programmes are tailored to the needs of the more disadvantaged persons on
the labour market, we expect positive impacts for groups with a higher score. Unfortunately,
most of the estimates are insigni¯cant and although the expected tendency is observable, one
has to be cautious with interpretation. Finally, we implement strati¯cation matching to analyse
if a higher participation probability also correlates with higher impacts. No clear picture can be
revealed. The estimated participation probability is no adequate measure for e®ect heterogeneity
here and successful integration into regular employment is determined by di®erent compositions
of the individual attributes than selection into programmes. Even though the results could
not con¯rm some of our hypotheses, they show that heterogeneity in treatment e®ects is an
important topic which has to be considered more accurately in further research. We have also
27shown that this might be a way to improve e±ciency of ALMP and hence to allocate scarce
resources more e®ectively.
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30A The Matching Estimator
The general form of matching estimators is given by:
¢MAT =
1
N1
X
i2I1
[Y 1
i ¡
X
j2I0
WN0(i;j)Y 0
j ]; (5)
where N0 is the number of observations in the comparison group I0 and N1 is the number of
observations in the treatment group I1. We estimate the e®ect of treatment for each treated
observation i 2 I1 in the treatment group, by contrasting her outcome with treatment with a
weighted average of comparison group observations j 2 I0. Matching estimators di®er in the
weights attached to the members of the comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd, 1998), where WN0(i;j) is the weight placed on the j-th individual from the comparison
group in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th individual of the treatment group. The
weights always satisfy
P
j WN0(i;j) = 1;8i; that is the total weight of all comparisons sums up
to one for each treated individual. De¯ne a neighbourhood C(Pi) for each i in the participant
sample and denote as neighbours for i those nonparticipants j 2 I0 for whom Pj 2 C(Pi).
Individuals matched to i are those people in the set Ai where Ai = fj 2 I0jPj 2 C(Pi)g.
Nearest neighbour (NN) matching sets
CNN(Pi) = min
j
kPi ¡ Pjk;j 2 N0; (6)
where k(:)k is obtained through a distance metric. Doing so, the nonparticipant with the value
of Pj that is closest to Pi is selected as the match, therefore:
WNN
N0N1(i;j) =
8
> <
> :
1 if kPi ¡ Pjk = minjkPi ¡ Pjk
0 otherwise
: (7)
Several variants of NN matching are proposed, e.g. NN matching `with' and `without replace-
ment'. In the former case a nonparticipating individual can be used more than once as a match,
whereas in the latter case it is considered only once. Matching with replacement involves a
trade-o® between bias and variance. If we allow replacement the average quality of the match-
ing will increase and the bias will decrease. NN matching faces the risk of bad matches, if the
closest neighbour is far away. This can be avoided by imposing a tolerance on the maximum
distance kPi ¡ Pjk allowed. This form of matching, caliper matching (Cochrane and Rubin,
1973), imposes the condition:
kPi ¡ Pjk < ²;j 2 N0; (8)
where ² is a pre-speci¯ed level of tolerance. The weights for caliper matching (CM) are given
by:
WCM(i;j) =
8
> <
> :
1 if kPi ¡ Pjk = minj kPi ¡ Pjk ^ kPi ¡ Pjk < ²
0 else
: (9)
31Treated observations for whom no matches within the neighbourhood C(Pi) = fPjjkPi¡Pjk < ²g
can be found are excluded from the analysis. Hence, caliper matching is one form of imposing
a common support condition.
B Data Sources and Attributes
Table B.1 gives detailed information of the data sources and the included attributes. A selection
of these attributes is used to estimate the participation probability.
Tab. B.1: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG
1 BewA and ST4
2 a) Socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number
of children, nationality, health restrictions
b) Quali¯cation: graduation, professional training, occupa-
tional group, position in last occupation, work experience, ap-
praisal of quali¯cation by the placement o±cer
c) Labour market history: duration of unemployment, du-
ration of last occupation, number of job o®ers, occupational
rehabilitation, programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN
3 d) Programme: institution that receives subsidy, activity
sector, time of quali¯cation and/or practical training during
programme, begin and end of programme (payment of the
subsidy), entry and leave of the participant, duration of pro-
gramme
1 Programme participants master data set (Ma¼nahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical pur-
poses (ST4)
3 Programme participants of subsidized employment data set (ST11TN)
C Regional Context Variables
The classi¯cation of the labour o±ce districts was undertaken by a project group of the FEA.
The aim of the project was to enhance the comparability of the labour o±ce districts for a
more e±cient allocation of funds. The 181 labour o±ce districts were split into twelve types
of o±ce districts with similar labour market circumstances. The comparability of the o±ce
districts is build upon several labour market characteristics. The most important criteria are
the underemployment quota and the corrected population density. The underemployment quota
is de¯ned as the relation of the sum of unemployed individuals and participants in several ALMP
programmes to the sum of all employed persons and these participants. The corrected population
density is used to improve the comparability of rural labour o±ce districts with metropolitan
32and city areas. In addition to that, the vacancy quota describing the relation of all reported
vacancies at the labour o±ce, the placement quota, that contains the number of placements
to the number of employments, and the quota of people who achieve maintenance allowance in
relation to the underemployment quota are used. Furthermore, an indicator for the tertiarisation
level built on the number of employed persons in agricultural occupations and an indicator for
the seasonal unemployment are considered.
The twelve types of comparable labour o±ce districts can be summarised into ¯ve types for
strategic purposes. Since almost all labour o±ce districts in East Germany belong to the ¯rst
of these ¯ve strategic types, we use the ¯ner typing of three groups here. For West Germany we
use the remaining four types for strategic purposes. Table C.1 presents the classi¯cation used
in the analysis, containing a short description of the clusters and the number of labour o±ces
in each clusters.
Tab. C.1: Classi¯cation of labour o±ce districts in Germany
Cluster Description No.
Ia East German labour o±ce districts with worst labour market conditions 5
Ib East German labour o±ce districts with bad labour market conditions 23
Ic East German labour o±ce districts with high unemployment 5
II Labour o±ce districts dominated by large cities 21
III West German labour o±ce districts with rural elements, medium-sized
industry and average unemployment
63
IV West German centers with good labour market prospects 10
V West German labour o±ce districts with the best labour market
prospects
47
No. describes the number of labour o±ces in cluster.
Source: Blien et al.(2004)
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